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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pablo Meraz Mendoza appeals from the district court's order summarily
dismissing his successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Prior Post-Conviction Proceedings
The facts and course of proceedings relating to Mendoza's first postconviction action are as set forth by the district court in its order giving Mendoza
notice of its intent to dismiss his successive petition for post-conviction relief:
Following Petitioner's trial before a jury in the instant action,
verdicts were returned on January 15, 1993, finding him guilty of
four counts of trafficking in heroin and one count of conspiracy to
deliver heroin. On March 5, 1993, a Judgment and Commitment
entered, sentencing Petitioner to a term of life in prison with the first
twenty years fixed for the offense of conspiracy to deliver heroin
and a term of seven years with the first three years fixed for each of
the counts of trafficking in heroin; each to run consecutively to the
other, but concurrently with the sentence for conspiracy to deliver
heroin. Petitioner appealed this judgment; however, the Supreme
Court of Idaho dismissed that appeal and a Remittitur entered on
March 4, 1994. Thereafter, Petitioner sought to reinstate his appeal
which was denied by the Idaho Supreme Court in its Order Denying
Motion to Reinstate Appeal dated October 6, 2000. Petitioner
subsequently filed a motion titled Correction of Illegal Sentence
(Rule 35) which the Court denied in its Order Denying Motion for
Correction of Sentence entered on April 9, 2007.
Petitioner
appealed this decision; however, the Idaho Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court in a decision filed on November 9, 2007, for
which a Remittitur entered on February 4, 2008. On June 23, 2010,
Petitioner filed his first post-conviction petition in Case No. CV-PC2010-12700, well past one year from the final remittitur by the Idaho
Court of Appeals and more than sixteen years from the remittitur
following the Idaho Supreme Court's dismissal of the appeal of his
Judgment of Conviction and Commitment, and therefore untimely.
See I.C. § 19-4902(a). The Court entered its Order Denying Motion
for Appointment of Counsel and Notice of Intent to Dismiss the
Application for Post-Conviction Relief as to Petitioner's first petition
on December 9, 2010. Having waited more than twenty days and
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having received no response from Petitioner, the Court entered its
Order dismissing Petitioner's first petition on January 10, 2011.
(R., p.125.)

Statement of Facts and Course of Successive Post-Conviction Proceedings
Mendoza filed a pro se successive petition for post-conviction relief in
October of 2012.

(R., pp.8-20.)

In it, Mendoza raised several issues of

ineffective assistance of counsel, including claims counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to the admission of prejudicial statements, failing to
object to the omission of certain jury instructions concerning a
charge of conspiracy, and failing to present testimony of witnesses
to impeach the testimony of the State's key witness.
(R., p.125.) The state asserted all of Mendoza's claims were subject to summary
dismissal because Mendoza had shown no basis for equitable tolling.

(R.,

pp.122-123.)
The district court filed an order giving Mendoza the statutory 20 days to
respond to its notice of intent to dismiss his successive petition for postconviction relief as untimely. (R., pp.124-128.) Mendoza filed a response to the
court's notice of its intent to dismiss, but failed to assert any basis for equitable
tolling under Idaho law. (R., pp.129-133.)
The district court then filed a memorandum decision and order dismissing
Mendoza's successive petition for post-conviction relief:
Petitioner in the case at bar has presented nothing in either his
petition or his response tending to show that his circumstances fall
within those situations where the equitable tolling doctrine would
apply. Having failed to do so, the Court finds that the Successive
Petition for Post Conviction Relief is untimely and there is no basis
for tolling the applicable time limits.
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(R., pp.134-135.)

Mendoza timely appealed from the judgment dismissing his

successive petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.137-142.)
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ISSUE
Mendoza states the issues on appeal as:
I. Does an Idaho District Court acquire jurisdiction to engrave an exception
for equitable tolling from Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), and its
progeny if facts demonstrate one of the principles set forth by the high
court?

II. Do facts in a petition for post-conviction relief that demonstrate
violations of the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel,
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to a fair trial raise the possibility of a
valid claim for equitable tolling when affixed to a claim of innocence?
(Appellant's brief, p.2.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Mendoza failed to establish that the district court erred by summarily
dismissing his successive post-conviction petition?
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ARGUMENT
Mendoza Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Erred By Summarily
Dismissing His Successive Post-Conviction Petition
A.

Introduction
The district court dismissed Mendoza's successive petition, finding

Mendoza failed to cite the court to any "facts which would raise the possibility of
tolling the time limits for filing his post-conviction petition[.]" (R., p.134.) The
district court further found the United States Supreme Court case relied on by
Medoza was inapplicable as it governed federal habeas corpus claims and not "a
petition in state court for post-conviction relief." (Id.) On appeal, Mendoza again
fails to assert any basis under which he is entitled to equitable tolling under Idaho
law but continues to assert federal law governing habeas corpus entitles him file
his successive state petition for post-conviction relief almost 19 years following
the filing of the remittitur following the dismissal of his original appeal.

(See

generally Appellant's brief, pp.7-10.)
Mendoza's argument on appeal is without merit.

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court exercises free review over the district court's

application of the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act. Evensiosky v. State,
136 Idaho 189, 190, 30 P.3d 967, 968 (2001).

On appeal from summary

dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the appellate court reviews the record to
determine if a genuine issue of material fact exists, which, if resolved in the
applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. Matthews v.
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State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 (1992); Aeschliman v. State,
132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 1999). Appellate courts freely
review whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Edwards v. Conchemco,
Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 (Ct. App. 1986).

C.

Dismissal Of Mendoza's Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
Was Appropriate
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a new and independent civil

proceeding and

the petitioner bears the burden of establishing,

by a

preponderance of the evidence, that he is entitled to relief. Workman v. State,
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007); State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho
676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983).

However, a petition for post-conviction

relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action. A petition must contain
more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that would suffice for a
complaint.

Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 522 (referencing I.R.C.P.

8). The petitioner must submit verified facts within his personal knowledge and
produce admissible evidence to support his allegations.
4903).

~

(citing I.C. § 19-

Furthermore, the factual showing in a post-conviction relief application

must be in the form of evidence that would be admissible at an evidentiary
hearing.

Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho 612, 617, 651 P.2d 546, 551 (1982);

Cowgerv. State, 132 Idaho 681,684,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 1999).
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own
initiative. 'To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must
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present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace,
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581,
583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to
summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises
no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims.
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c));
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.

While a court must accept a

petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept
either the applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible
evidence, or the applicant's conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164
P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112
(2001)). If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief,
the trial court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing
the petition.

l!i (citing

Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220

(1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting
of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original
proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law."

l!i

Applying these principles in this case, the district court summarily
dismissed Mendoza's petition as untimely.

Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) requires

that a post-conviction proceeding be commenced by filing a petition "any time
within one (1) year from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the
determination of an appeal or from the determination of proceedings following an

7

appeal, whichever is later." Absent a showing by the petitioner that the one-year
statute of limitation should be tolled, the failure to file a timely petition for postconviction relief is a basis for dismissal of the petition.

Evensiosky v. State, 136

Idaho 189, 30 P.3d 967 (2001); Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776,
778 (Ct. App. 2003). The only three circumstances in which Idaho recognizes
equitable tolling are: (1) "where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state
facility on an in-state conviction without legal representation or access to Idaho
legal materials," Sayas, 139 Idaho at 960, 88 P.3d at 779; (2) "where mental
disease and/or psychotropic medication renders a petitioner incompetent and
prevents petitioner from earlier pursuing challenges to his conviction," kL and (3)
where there are '"claims which simply [were] not known to the defendant within
the time limit, yet raise important due process issues,"' Rhoades v. State, 148
Idaho 247, 250, 220 P.3d 1066, 1069 (2009) (quoting Charboneau v. State, 144
Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007)).

Mendoza's petition did not allege

any of the foregoing bases as a reason to toll the limitation period for filing his
petition. (See generally Appellant's brief, pp.8-20.)
Applying the above principles in this case, the district court summarily
dismissed Mendoza's petition. Contrary to Mendoza's assertions on appeal, a
review of the record and the applicable law supports the district court's order of
summary dismissal. Mendoza's successive petition was filed October 4, 2012,
almost 19 years following the 1994 filing of the remittitur following the dismissal
of his original appeal.
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Mendoza does not argue that his claims were not known to him or could
not reasonably have been known to him in the requisite time-frame for filing his
initial post-conviction petition.

Instead, Mendoza claims he is entitled to the

tolling of the time limit for filing set by state statute by virtue of a United States
Supreme Court case addressing the filing of habeas corpus petitions.

(See

Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.) In Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986), the Court
held that state procedural default of claims is binding in federal habeas corpus
proceedings absent a showing of cause and prejudice, which must, at a
minimum, rise to the level of being caused by factors external to the defense or
ineffective assistance of counsel.

Mendoza does not cite any controlling state

cases addressing the statute controlling actions pursued under the UPCPA or for
his position that he is entitled to tolling of the time limit in which to file a
successive petition for post-conviction relief.

Mendoza further asserts trial

counsel's mistakes at trial violated his sixth and fourteenth amendment rights
"which caused the conviction of an innocent person and thus raise a valid claim
for equitable tolling." (Appellant's brief, p.8.) However, Mendoza again fails to
even allege a basis for the tolling of time pursuant to statute, let alone show
cause why such claim was not known to him or could not reasonably have been
known to him in the requisite time-frame for filing his initial post-conviction
petition.
Because Mendoza failed to justify the untimely filing of his petition, he has
failed to show that the district court erred in dismissing his successive petition for
post-conviction relief filed some 19 years after his original conviction.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Mendoza's successive petition for post-conviction
relief.

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 4th day of September, 2013, I caused
two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be
placed in the United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to:
PABLO MERAZ-MENDOZA
INMATE NO. 38267
ICC, Unit B-218-B
PO Box 70010
Boise, Idaho 83707

NLS/pm
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